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Centralized wage setting arrangements compress wage differentials along many 
dimensions, but how do they affect employment structure? To address this issue, we 
relate the evolution of U.S.-Swedish differences in the industry distribution of 
employment to relative wages between and within industries. We find that centralized 
wage setting shifted Swedish employment away from industries with high wage 
dispersion among workers, a high mean wage and, especially, a low mean wage. The 
dissolution of Sweden’s centralized wage-setting beginning in 1983 led to widening 
wage differentials and a reversal in the evolution of U.S.-Swedish differences in 
industry structure.  
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Second on his “list of eleven things that … we do know” about how institutions affect 
outcomes, Freeman (1998) states that “Institutions Reduce the Dispersion of Earnings.” He 
points to collective bargaining, centralized wage setting, minimum wage laws and progressive 
taxation as important in this regard. He also cites a variety of studies that provide evidence of 
a major role for such institutions in compressing wage differentials. Blau and Kahn (1999) 
sound similar notes in their extensive survey of research on labor market institutions. 
Evidence that institutions help shape the wage structure leads directly to other questions 
about their role in determining outcomes. We pursue one such question: How do labor market 
institutions that compress wage differentials affect the industry distribution of employment? 
The logic behind this question is straightforward:  If relative wages influence the allocation of 
workers and cooperating factors of production, then institutional forces that compress wage 
differentials also affect the structure of employment.
1    
To address the question, we examine the evolution of Sweden’s industry distribution of 
employment from 1960 to 1994 and compare it to the U.S. distribution over the same period. 
Specifically, we relate the evolution of U.S.-Swedish differences in the industry distribution 
to the structure of relative wages between and within industries. We find that centralized wage 
setting alters the industry structure of employment in three directions: away from low-wage 
industries, away from high-wage industries and away from industries with high wage 
dispersion among workers. These effects intensified as centralized wage-spreading spread 
through the Swedish economy, and they reversed after the dissolution of centralized wage 
setting. The effects are large, at their peak accounting for 40 percent of U.S.-Swedish 
differences in industry structure. They also account for much of the evolution in the U.S.-
Swedish differences between 1970 and 1994.     2
Three sets of remarks motivate our analysis and comparative treatment of the Swedish 
experience. First, collective bargaining dominates the wage-setting process in Sweden. 88 
percent of Swedish employees belonged to a labor union in 1980, as compared to only 20 
percent of U.S. workers in 1983.
2 National differences in wage-setting institutions are even 
more pronounced than suggested by the union membership figures. From 1956 to 1982, the 
wage formation process in Sweden was dominated by centralized negotiations between the 
major employer confederation, SAF, and the largest labor organization, LO. LO advocated 
and vigorously pursued a “solidarity” wage policy aimed at compressing wage differentials 
and promoting the restructuring of the Swedish economy away from low-wage sectors. 
Beginning in the mid 1960s, centralized negotiations also came to play a major role in the 
wage formation process for most white-collar workers and many professional workers. 
Second, Swedish wage-setting institutions were a major determinant of relative wage 
outcomes. As is well known, Sweden has a compressed wage distribution compared to other 
advanced economies, especially the United States. There is compelling evidence that Swedish 
wage-setting institutions brought about a remarkably and increasingly compressed wage 
distribution between the early 1960s and early 1980s. Moreover, the partial breakdown of 
Sweden’s centralized wage-bargaining regime in 1983, followed by a complete collapse over 
the next few years, initiated an expansion in wage differentials along many dimensions. The 
U.S. experience, in contrast, exhibits flat or rising overall wage inequality after the late 1960s, 
including dramatic and sustained increases in wage inequality beginning around 1980. Thus 
the Swedish experience offers an attractive laboratory for investigating how institutions that 
compress wage differentials influence the structure of employment. The U.S. economy, which 
is characterized by a much smaller role for collective bargaining, in general, and for 
centralized wage setting, in particular, provides a useful benchmark against which to evaluate 
the Swedish experience. 
Third, there is much to explain in the way of U.S.-Swedish differences in the industry 
employment distribution and in the evolution of these differences over time. Based on a 
detailed concordance between the U.S. and Swedish industrial classification systems that we 
constructed for this study, we find a modest narrowing of the gap between the employment 
distributions in the two countries from 1960 to 1970, considerable divergence between 1970 
and the middle 1980s, and a sharp narrowing of the distance after the mid 1980s. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1 Much previous research attributes an important role to wage-setting arrangements in explanations for national 
differences in aggregate employment and unemployment outcomes. See Nickell and Layard (1999). 
2 Table 10.2 in Freeman and Gibbons (1995) and Table 695 in U.S. Bureau of the Census (1995).   3
Some previous work investigates the effects of Swedish wage-setting institutions on the 
industry distribution of employment. Edin and Topel (1997) show that employment grew 
more rapidly from 1960 to 1970 and from 1970 to 1990 in Swedish industries that had (a) 
higher initial wages and (b) more rapid wage growth. Davis and Henrekson (1997, 1999) 
show that the industry distribution of employment in Sweden tilts away from low-wage 
towards high-wage and, especially, medium-wage industries relative to the U.S. distribution 
as of the mid 1980s. Both studies support the view that wage compression promoted the 
restructuring of the Swedish economy away from low-wage industries. 
Our study differs from and improves upon earlier work in two important respects: First, 
our data set covers a longer time period, contains more frequent observations, and uses finer 
industry classifications outside the manufacturing sector. Better data enable us to more closely 
relate wage structure variables and wage-setting institutions to the timing and nature of U.S.-
Swedish differences in the employment distribution. We pursue a difference-in-difference 
style of investigation in much of this study, whereas Edin-Topel mainly examined differences 
over time within Sweden and our earlier work mainly examined between-country differences 
at a point in time. Second, we consider how within-industry wage dispersion relates to the 
employment distribution, whereas earlier work considers only the role of industry-level mean 
wages relative to the overall mean wage.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes Swedish wage-setting institutions 
and relative wage outcomes. The discussion motivates several hypotheses about the impact of 
wage-setting institutions on the industry distribution of employment. Section 2 also identifies 
other policies and developments that reinforced the effects of wage-setting institutions or 
facilitated a compression of wage differentials. Section 3 describes the evolution of U.S.-
Swedish differences in the industry distribution of employment and documents how they 
relate to industry-level measures of worker schooling intensity, mean wages and wage 
dispersion. Section 4 investigates several hypotheses about the role of wage structure 
variables in accounting for U.S.-Swedish differences in the industry distribution of 
employment and their evolution over time. Section 5 summarizes the empirical findings and 
discusses some of their implications.   4
2. Sweden’s Wage Structure and Institutional Setting 
 
2.1 A Compressed Wage Distribution 
Comparisons of national wage structures in the 1980s and 1990s place Sweden among the set 
of countries with the least earnings inequality. OECD (1993, Table 5.2) highlights the 
comparatively compressed nature of the Swedish earnings distribution using data on hourly 
wages for men in 15 countries. As of 1990 or thereabouts, Sweden has the lowest 90-10 ratio 
of hourly wages and the highest 10-50 ratio.
3 In both respects, the United States stands far 
away at the opposite end of the spectrum. Multi-year earnings measures also show less 
inequality in Sweden than in the United States during the 1980s (Aaberge et al., 2002). More 
detailed and extensive international comparisons of wage dispersion such as Blau and Kahn 
(1996) also place Sweden and the United States at or near opposite ends of the earnings 
inequality spectrum. 
Compared to other countries, especially the United States, Sweden also has narrow 
wage differentials along a variety of specific dimensions. As of the 1980s, Sweden had a 
comparatively narrow male-female wage gap (Blau and Kahn, 1995), a small discount on 
wages for new entrants relative to more experienced workers (Edin and Topel, 1997), a low 
return to job tenure (Edin and Zetterberg, 1992), a low return to schooling (Edin and 
Holmlund, 1995 and Edin and Topel, 1997) and small industry wage differentials (Edin and 
Zetterberg, 1992). In short, Swedish wage differentials are compressed in comparison to most 
other countries and highly so compared to the United States. 
In large measure, the stark contrast between Swedish wage compression and U.S. wage 
dispersion reflects very different evolutions of wage inequality in the two countries from the 
mid 1960s to the early 1980s. Figure 1 highlights this fact. The figure plots a standard 
measure of U.S. wage inequality alongside three measures of Swedish wage inequality 
derived from independent data sources. All three sources point to sharply declining wage 
inequality in Sweden until the early 1980s and rising inequality thereafter. Edin and Topel 
(1997, Table 4.2) find a very similar time-series pattern in Swedish returns to schooling.
4 
Hibbs and Locking (2000, Figure 1) find declines in Swedish wage inequality among blue-
collar workers in the private sector after 1962, the start of their sample period, and very rapid 
declines after 1965. They report that the squared coefficient of variation for blue-collar wages 
declined by a “whopping 75 percent” between 1962 and 1983. 
                                                           
3 See also Björklund and Freeman (1997) for additional details.   5
In short, U.S. and Swedish wage inequality levels appear similar in the late 1960s, but 
they diverged very rapidly over the next decade and a half.
5 As we discuss below, the 1983 
trough in Swedish wage inequality coincides with the onset of the breakdown in centralized 
wage-setting patterns. 
 
2.2 The Role of Wage-Setting Institutions 
A large body of research associates “institutions”, especially collective bargaining and 
centralized wage setting, with compressed wage differentials and lower earnings inequality. 
We refer the reader to Freeman (1998) and Blau and Kahn (1999, 2002) for extensive 
discussions of the relevant literature. We focus here on Swedish wage-setting institutions and 
their effects on the wage structure.
6 
Collective bargaining dominated the wage formation process in Sweden throughout the 
period covered by our study. The era of sharp compression in wage differentials contains two 
distinct phases of centralized, “solidarity” bargaining. The first phase, extending through the 
late 1960s, emphasized “equal pay for equal work” and is associated with the leveling of 
wages across industries, regions and plants. The second phase, running from 1969-70 through 
1982 and often caricatured as “equal pay for all work”, is associated with the leveling of 
wages across workers and occupations within industries and plants. A third phase, which 
began in 1983, saw the dissolution of centralized wage setting and the expansion of wage 
differentials along many dimensions. Failed efforts by the Swedish government to re-institute 
centralized wage bargaining in 1989 effectively marked the end of the regime (Freeman and 
Gibbons, 1995, Hibbs and Locking, 2000). For a large fraction of the workforce after 1983, 
and the vast majority of all workers after 1988, wages were determined by industry-level and 
plant-level bargaining. 
Under the centralized regime, wages were largely determined as the outcome of 
detailed negotiations between national bargaining organizations that represented employers 
and unions. The most important negotiations, especially prior to the 1970s, took place 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
4 However, their Table 4.1 shows stable or declining returns to experience in Sweden throughout the period from 
1968 to 1988.  
5 Given the pitfalls in simple comparisons of wage inequality across countries, the different time-series behavior 
of U.S. and Swedish inequality in Figure 1 deserves more weight than the apparently similar level of inequality 
in the late 1960s. In this regard, we note that the unweighted standard deviation of log hourly wages in the U.S. 
data set is larger than the hours-weighted measure shown in Figure 1 by .02 to .05, depending on year. It is also 
worthwhile to stress that Figure 1 reports pre-tax, pre-transfer measures of earnings inequality. 
6 The following discussion draws on conversations with several persons mentioned in the acknowledgements and 
on Ahlén (1989), De Geer (1992), Edin and Topel (1997), Elvander (1988), Elvander and Holmlund (1997), 
Freeman and Gibbons (1995), Nilsson (1993) and Hibbs and Locking (2000).   6
between SAF, the leading association of employers, and LO, a federation of blue-collar 
unions.
7 From 1956 to 1982, SAF and LO regularly negotiated central framework agreements 
that governed wage setting for all blue-collar workers in the Swedish private sector. These 
framework agreements were implemented through subsequent rounds of industry-level and 
plant-level bargaining. Wage drift ─ i.e., individual wage supplements and locally bargained 
wage increases in excess of central framework agreements ─ was moderate under the 
centralized wage-setting regime, but its importance grew after the mid 1970s (Ahlén, 1989).  
During the 1950s and 1960s, the LO-SAF agreements invariably preceded the ones 
involving white-collar workers, and the agreements negotiated by the white-collar unions 
closely mirrored the terms of LO-SAF agreements. However, the agreements for white-collar 
workers allowed greater individual wage variation and more scope for wage drift. 
Adjustments for wage drift were explicitly factored into the agreements involving the LO and 
public sector unions. In particular, these agreements provided retrospective pay adjustments in 
response to wage drift among white-collar workers in the private sector.
8 The importance of 
contractually specified adjustments for wage drift gradually diminished during the 1970s (De 
Geer, 1992). As an outcome of these arrangements, relative wages between blue-collar and 
white-collar workers were, to a considerable extent, stipulated by central level agreements 
until the early 1980s. 
Formal arrangements for centralized wage setting developed later for white-collar 
workers than for blue-collar workers. Wage negotiations in the public sector became 
increasingly centralized beginning in 1966 and fully centralized following severe labor 
conflicts in 1970-71. The centralized wage-setting process in the public sector was very 
strongly oriented to the narrowing of wage dispersion and remained largely intact until the 
late 1980s (Elvander, 1988, Elvander and Holmlund, 1997). 
Beginning in 1966, wage setting for most white-collar workers in the private sector also 
came to be determined in national negotiations between SAF and PTK, the chief cartel for 
private sector white-collar unions. By 1970–71, a national system of centralized wage 
bargaining for white-collar workers was firmly in place.
9 This arrangement lasted until 1988, 
                                                           
7 As of the late 1980s, SAF represented 40,000 firms in private industry, including all of the largest ones, and LO 
represented 90 percent of blue-collar workers (Ahlén, 1989, page 331). 
8 According to Bo Sundén (personal communication), blue-collar union groups closely followed wage statistics 
for selected white-collar groups during the period of strong wage equalization. Many blue-collar wage 
agreements at both the plant and industry level stipulated that the blue-collar group would be compensated if the 
white-collar reference group received larger than expected wage hikes. In the public sector, the employers' 
associations actively pursed wage policies aimed at higher wage floors and lower wage dispersion. 
9 University-educated professionals, as distinct from white-collar workers, accounted for only a small (but 
growing) fraction of the Swedish workforce during the centralized wage-setting era. Professionals belonged to   7
when the engineers’ union broke out and struck a separate agreement with their employers’ 
federation (Elvander and Holmlund, 1997). 
Several aspects of the wage-setting apparatus in Sweden helped to monitor and enforce 
the central framework agreements. First, until 1990 the SAF collected wage statistics for all 
employees of member firms. Second, a firm risked retaliation by labor unions if it raised 
wages for highly skilled workers above the levels prescribed by the central framework 
agreement. Third, the SAF charter authorized fines and sanctions against firms that deviated 
from the central agreement.
10 Fourth, the SAF controlled a large “conflict fund” that could be 
drawn upon by SAF employers in good standing who were involved in lock outs or strikes. 
So, a firm that deviated from the framework agreement invited retaliation from labor unions at 
the same time as it risked losing access to the conflict fund. Finally, the SAF had a long 
history of centralism and internal discipline that discouraged competition among firms on the 
basis of worker compensation. 
These wage-setting arrangements did not develop in an economic or ideological 
vacuum. In Sweden, the idea of centralized wage bargaining as a means to achieve solidarity 
among workers and reduce wage inequality dates back to at least 1936 and was forcefully 
advocated by prominent LO economists in the late 1940s and early 1950s. By 1956, this view 
had been adopted by LO leadership. For different reasons, leading Swedish employers also 
favored centralized wage determination in the early postwar decades. As Hibbs and Locking 
(2000) write, “SAF also took a leading role in promoting the development of national 
bargaining, because large-scale manufacturing firms comprising SAF’s most important 
constituency believed that centralization would inhibit wage pressure from powerful unions in 
sheltered sectors from spilling over to wage settlements in the competitive, traded goods 
sector.” 
“Equal pay for equal work”, regardless of employer profits or ability to pay, was the 
guiding principle during the first phase of centralized wage determination. Advocates for this 
principle argued that it would promote worker solidarity and the restructuring of the economy 
toward more profitable and productive firms and sectors (Edin and Topel, 1997). This 
restructuring argument resonates with theories that interpret wage differentials among firms 
and industries as indicative of departures from efficient factor allocations in an idealized 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
different unions than blue-collar workers, but even for many professionals, wages were determined by 
centralized bargaining. 
10 Fines and sanctions were occasionally imposed. Volvo, for example, was subjected to fines in the early 1970s 
when it raised wages above the central framework agreement in order to attract higher quality workers.   8
competitive setting.
11 By all accounts, the weight accorded to the restructuring objective 
diminished after 1970, and wage compression in and of itself came to dominate the rhetoric of 
wage-setting negotiations and the content of compensation agreements. 
In summary, centralized wage setting took root among blue-collar workers in 1956 and 
played a leading role in wage formation throughout the Swedish economy. Formal 
arrangements for centralized wage setting spread to white-collar and public sector workers in 
the second half of the 1960s. The centralized regime remained intact until 1983, when key 
defections initiated a process of dissolution that was effectively complete by 1989. A broad 
consensus among participants and researchers holds that the rise of centralized wage-setting 
arrangements was a major force behind the increasing compression of Swedish wage 
differentials in the period leading up to 1983, and that the demise of these arrangements led to 
widening wage differentials.
12  
This account motivates several hypotheses about the impact of wage-setting institutions 
on the industry distribution of employment: First, Sweden’s centralized wage-setting regime 
disfavored industries that, for efficiency reasons, have high wage dispersion. Second, the 
centralized regime likewise disfavored industries with mean compensation levels nearer to the 
tails of the industry wage structure. Third, the centralized regime had stronger adverse effects 
on employment in low-wage than high-wage industries. Key participants in the centralized 
wage-setting process explicitly advocated wage floors to promote the restructuring of the 
economy away from low-wage sectors. There was no corresponding impetus to restructure the 
economy away from high-wage sectors. In addition, upward wage drift at the industry and 
local levels was subject to some, mostly informal, penalties, but it still functioned as an 
escape valve when centrally negotiated wages were set too low for highly productive 
industries, plants or workers. There was no corresponding escape valve when nationally 
bargained wages were set too high at the low end.
13  
Our account of Swedish wage-setting arrangements also makes predictions about the 
timing of these effects. In particular, we hypothesize that the effects on industry structure first 
intensify over time, reaching a peak around the middle 1980s, and then subside after the 
middle to late 1980s in response to the demise of centralized wage setting. Section 4 gives 
these timing and wage structure hypotheses a more precise formulation and tests them. 
                                                           
11 See, e.g., Hibbs and Locking (2000) for an elaboration on this point. 
12 Freeman and Gibbons (1995) analyze the economic forces that contributed to the breakdown of centralized 
bargaining. 
13 In other countries, too, centralized wage-setting institutions more rigidly compress the wage structure at the 
low end than at the high end. See Blau and Kahn (1996) for some evidence.   9
2.3 Complementary and Reinforcing Policies 
Sweden pursued several economic policies that reinforced or facilitated the effects of its 
wage-setting institutions on the industry distribution of employment. The most important 
policy development for our purposes was the dramatic expansion in public employment after 
1960, mainly in the form of social services supplied by the local government sector.
14 Public 
sector employment growth facilitated wage compression in two ways. First, it propped up 
demand for less skilled and lower wage workers, which made it easier to raise wages near the 
low end without causing high unemployment (Edin and Topel, 1997). Second, the rise in 
public employment involved a major shift towards a sector with low wage dispersion. 
We document the timing and magnitude of the Swedish employment shift towards 
social services in section 3. This shift continued through the middle 1980s and, hence, 
overlaps with the rising importance of centralized wage-setting institutions. However, there is 
no abrupt reversal in this phenomenon after 1985 that mirrors the breakdown of centralized 
wage setting. Hence, the rise and fall of centralized wage setting provides leverage to identify 
the effect of wage-setting institutions in the context of an expanding and expansive welfare 
state. In addition, the results reported in section 4 hold up when we restrict the sample to 
exclude industries in the Public Administration and Welfare sectors. 
The taxation of business income probably played some role in facilitating the effects of 
centralized wage setting on the industry structure. Two aspects of the Swedish tax system are 
noteworthy in this regard. First, Sweden has had high statutory tax rates on corporate profits 
but much lower effective tax rates because of accelerated depreciation provisions and other 
loopholes. Capital-intensive manufacturing industries, which tend to have above-average 
mean wages and low wage dispersion, can more readily exploit these loopholes than most 
other industries. Second, institutional ownership by pension funds and life insurance 
companies has been heavily tax-preferred in Sweden as compared to direct business 
ownership by households. This aspect of the tax system disfavored owner-operated personal 
and business services, which tend to have relatively low mean wages and high wage 
dispersion.
15 
Two labor market interventions in Sweden also deserve mention. First, tight job 
security provisions increased relative labor costs in high turnover industries, which tend to 
pay low wages and employ less skilled workers (Davis and Henrekson, 1999). This policy 
                                                           
14 See Rosen (1997) for an extended and insightful analysis of this development. 
15 Davis and Henrekson (1999) discuss Swedish taxation of business income in greater detail. They also provide 
evidence on the magnitude of certain tax wedges associated with the taxation of business income, including 
evidence that these wedges were larger in Sweden than in the United States and other countries.   10
reinforced the adverse relative cost effects of centralized wage setting on low-wage industries. 
Second, active labor market policies propped up demand for workers who were displaced 
from declining sectors and may have eased their reallocation to expanding sectors (Forslund 
and Krueger, 1997). 
Like public sector employment expansion, the active labor market policies and the 
Swedish system of business taxation helped to facilitate the effects of centralized wage-setting 
institutions on the industry distribution, while forestalling the emergence of high 
unemployment rates. Tight job security provisions reinforced certain effects of centralized 
wage setting by raising relative labor costs for low-wage employers. 
 
2.4 The Role of the Skill Distribution 
To what extent does Sweden’s compressed wage distribution simply reflect an equally 
compressed distribution of skills? Björklund and Freeman (1997) pursue this question at some 
length. They conclude that greater equalization of backgrounds and human capital formation 
in Sweden is not sufficient to explain the greater equalization of earnings. In their words (p. 
61), “Producing [such] an egalitarian distribution requires direct intervention in the income 
determination process.” Hibbs and Locking (1996) and Edin and Topel (1997) arrive at 
similar assessments based on quite different evidence and analyses. While each piece of 
evidence in these studies is susceptible to alternative interpretations, the whole body of 
evidence strongly favors the view that wage-setting institutions and direct policy interventions 
played a major role in bringing about Sweden’s compressed wage structure and its evolution 
over time. 
This conclusion about the importance of institutional forces does not deny a role for 
conventional market forces in the evolution of Swedish relative wages. Indeed, Edin and 
Holmlund (1995) argue that much of the time-series behavior of Swedish education and 
experience differentials can be explained by relative supply shifts. However, a role for relative 
supply (or demand) shifts in Swedish wage structure developments does not undermine our 
empirical strategy. In this regard, we stress three points. First, we require only that wage-
setting institutions attenuated the magnitude of swings that would have occurred in a 
decentralized wage-setting regime. Second, our empirical approach controls for demand and 
supply shifts that are common to Sweden and the United States. Third, as we spell out more 
fully in section 4, our institutional perspective generates a number of specific hypotheses 
regarding the direction and timing of movements in the Swedish industry structure.  It is   11
highly implausible that country-specific demand and supply shifts operated in just the right 
way and with the right timing to produce exactly the set of effects predicted by our 
institutional perspective.  
 
3. U.S.-Swedish Differences in the Industry Distribution 
3.1 Divergence and a Partial Reversal 
To examine U.S.-Swedish differences in the industry distribution of employment, we 
constructed panel data on industry-level outcomes in the two countries at roughly five-year 
intervals from 1960 to 1994. The Data Appendix describes our sources, provides summary 
statistics and lists our 61-industry breakdown for the two economies. An additional appendix 
in Davis and Henrekson (2001) details the concordance that we prepared for the U.S. and 
Swedish industrial classification systems. 
Based on the industry-level data, Table 1 shows three measures of distance between the 
U.S. and Swedish employment distributions from 1960 to 1994. The table reports time series 
for the weighted mean of the absolute log employment share ratios,  
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where   denotes the share of a country’s employment in industry i at time t.  it S
The three measures tell similar but not identical stories: a modest narrowing from 1960 
to 1970 in the overall distance between the U.S. and Swedish distributions, considerable 
divergence after 1970 or 1975 (rapid in the first half of the 1980s), and a sharp narrowing of   12
the distance after the mid 1980s. The standard deviation measure, which gives greater weight 
to extreme differences, shows a somewhat later onset of the divergence and an earlier start to 
the reversal. All three measures show sharp divergence followed by an abrupt reversal. In 
terms of the sum of absolute share differences, the distance between the U.S. and Swedish 
industry distributions moves almost full circle in the quarter century from 1970 to 1994. The 
other two measures show a partial reversal. 
Table 2 shows that the 1990–94 convergence, which coincided with a profound 
recession in Sweden, mainly reflects shifts in the Swedish industry distribution. For the 
United States, the 1990-94 period was one of quiescence in the industry structure.  In other 
words, the Swedish industry distribution lurched towards the U.S. industry distribution in the 
early 1990s following an extended period of divergence. 
Table 2 also shows that the cumulative change in the industry distribution of 
employment was considerably larger in Sweden than in the U.S. The cumulative sum of 
absolute employment share changes from 1960 to 1994 is 160 percentage points in Sweden as 
compared to only 115 points in the United States. Thus, the divergence and partial 
reconvergence of the industry distributions in the two countries involved greater shifting over 
time in the Swedish industry distribution. 
 
3.2 Relative Shifts in Broad Industry Shares 
Tables 1 and 2 provide useful information about overall distance and intensity of change in 
the industry employment distributions, but they say little about the nature of the between-
country differences or their changes over time. To help sketch a more detailed picture in these 
regards, we examine several other measures. 
Table 3 reports differences betwen U.S. and Swedish employment shares for eleven 
broad industry categories. Some pronounced differences hold up throughout the entire 1960-
1994 period. For example, Business Services and FIRE, Lodging and Dining, Personal 
Services and Trade consistently account for a larger fraction of U.S. employment. 
Manufacturing and Construction consistently account for a larger fraction of Swedish 
employment. 
More to the point for our purposes are the shifts in relative industry shares over time. 
Several developments stand out. Most strikingly, Sweden’s relative share of employment in 
Public Administration, Welfare, Health and Education (“Social Services”) rose tremendously 
between 1960 and 1985. As of 1960, this category accounted for an extra 2.3 percent of   13
employment in the United States relative to Sweden. By 1970, the situation reversed and an 
extra 1.3 percent of Swedish workers were engaged in this sector. Relative Swedish 
employment in Social Services continued to expand until 1985, by which time it accounted 
for an extra one-tenth of Swedish employment. This strikes us as an enormous disparity in the 
structure of employment for two countries at similar levels of economic development. The 
huge relative shift towards Social Services from 1960 to 1985 indicates how profoundly the 
expansion of the Swedish welfare state influenced the structure of its economy.
16 
Relative Swedish employment declined from 1960 to 1985 in Lodging and Dining, 
Business Services, Manufacturing and Construction. For Manufacturing, most of the change 
occurred in the 1960s. For private sector service industries, the bulk of the changes occurred 
after 1970. From 1970 to 1985, relative Swedish employment shares fell sharply in Trade, 
Lodging and Dining, Personal Services and Business Services. These sharp movements away 
from private sector service employment took place against an initial situation, as of 1960 or 
1970, in which private sector service industries already accounted for a relatively small share 
of Swedish employment. 
The about-face from 1990 to 1994 in the evolution of Sweden’s industry distribution 
involved sharp increases in the relative employment shares of Trade and Business Services 
and declines in Manufacturing and Construction. After contracting from 1985 to 1990, 
Sweden’s relative employment share in Social Services grew modestly from 1990 to 1994, 
probably as a direct consequence of the severe recession. To reiterate, the “partial reversal” in 
the evolution of Sweden’s industry distribution after the mid 1980s does not reflect a scaling 
down of the welfare state. 
 
3.3 Directional Measures of Distance and Change 
Let   denote a measurable characteristic of industry i. Consider the weighted mean of  i X X  in 
country c, 






t X S X M ,  (4)
where the weight,  , is the share of industry-i employment in c at t. Using this type of index, 
we quantify directional measures of distance between the U.S. and Swedish industry 




                                                           
16 As Rosen (1997) stresses, much of this expansion in the Swedish welfare state involves a shift into the market 
sector of activities like child care and elderly care that were traditionally provided in the household sector.   14
variables that correspond to industry-level measures of schooling, mean wages and wage 
dispersion. We rely on U.S.-based measures of industry-level characteristics for reasons of 
data availability and to maintain consistency with our general approach of treating U.S. 
outcomes as a benchmark. 
Table 4 shows that, as of 1960, the weighted mean years of schooling was 12.66 in the 
United States as compared to 12.45 in Sweden. The schooling intensity of the industry 
distribution rose steadily in both countries over the next few decades, but more so in Sweden. 
Sometime during the second half of the 1970s, the Swedish industry distribution became more 
schooling intensive than the U.S. distribution, although mean years of schooling remained 
higher for U.S. workers. 
Because formal schooling requirements are high in many public sector jobs, we 
recomputed the indexes of schooling intensity after excluding employment in Public 
Administration and Welfare Services.  These results, also reported in Table 4, suggest that the 
expansion of the Swedish welfare state accounts for about one-third of the relative Swedish 
shift towards schooling intensive industries between 1960 and 1985. 
Table 5 reports the weighted mean of log wages in the two countries. The industry-level 
means are computed from 1984-1986 data on log hourly wages for U.S. workers.
17 As of 
1960, the weighted mean is already 1.5 percentage points larger in Sweden, and it proceeds to 
rise over the next quarter century, especially from 1970 to 1985. Indeed, by 1985 the 
between-country differences in the industry distribution account for 5.5 percent higher wages 
in Sweden. This finding supports the view that the “solidarity” wage policy had some success 
in promoting the restructuring of the Swedish economy towards higher wage industries. The 
U.S. industry distribution also drifted towards higher wage industries from 1960 to 1980, but 
the pace was much more rapid in Sweden. More generally, Table 5 suggests that national 
differences in industry structure can account for nontrivial differences in wage levels.  
The rightmost two columns in Table 5 break down the indexes into components that 
reflect predicted and residual wage variation. Here, the predicted log wage is based on a 
standard human capital regression that relates individual log wages to a flexible specification 
in schooling, experience and sex. The results show that the evolution of U.S.-Swedish 
differences in the industry mean of log wages predominantly reflects industry wage 
differentials that are accounted for by easily observed worker characteristics.  However, 
Sweden’s relative shift towards higher wage industries also reflects some movement toward 
                                                           
17 We compute industry-level mean log wages from data on individual workers in the March files of the Current 
Population Survey for the wage years 1984 to 1986. See the Data Appendix for details.   15
industries with higher mean wages after conditioning on standard proxies for the human 
capital characteristics of workers. 
Table 6 reports the weighted mean of within-industry wage dispersion in the two 
countries.
18 The table shows a steady march by the U.S. employment distribution towards 
industries with greater wage dispersion. In contrast, Sweden exhibits no clear pattern in this 
regard, although the index value rises somewhat over the sample period. As of 1970, the U.S. 
and Swedish industry distributions generate identical values of 54.36 percent for the wage 
dispersion index. Over the next 20 years, the difference between the U.S. and Swedish index 
values rises and eventually peaks in 1990 at about six-tenths of a percentage point. This is a 
small effect relative to the gap between U.S. and Swedish wage inequality that opened up 
after 1970. In terms of Figure 1, it accounts for roughly 5 percent of the U.S.-Swedish gap in 
the standard deviation of log hourly wages that opened up from 1968 to 1984. 
As before, we use a standard wage regression to construct indexes based on predicted 
and residual log wages. From the regression estimates, we compute industry-level measures 
of the standard deviation of predicted and residual log wages. These measures serve as  X  
variables in the index formula (4). The rightmost two columns in Table 6 report the results, 
and an interesting finding emerges: The Swedish index of dispersion in residual log wages 
falls continuously relative to the U.S. index from 1970 to 1990.  In other words, the Swedish 
employment distribution undergoes a steady relative shift away from industries with high 
residual wage dispersion. Between 1970 and 1990, this shift involves a relative decline of 
more than one percentage point in Sweden’s residual wage dispersion, which amounts to 
about 10 percent of the rise in the U.S.-Swedish inequality gap over the period. 
This finding fits well with our story about the effects of Swedish wage-setting 
institutions on the industry distribution of employment. Insofar as industry differences in 
residual wage dispersion reflect efficiency considerations, wage compression reduces the 
relative productivity of industries with high efficient levels of residual wage dispersion. This 
effect of wage-setting institutions on relative productivity levels is likely to move industry 
employment shares in the same direction.  
But other forces may also be at work. Two forces that plausibly play an important role 
in this regard are the expansion of the Swedish welfare state and declines in explicit and 
                                                           
18 To calculate the Table 6 entries, we first compute the standard deviation of log hourly wages for each industry 
using 1984-1986 data on individual U.S. workers. We then construct wage dispersion indexes according to 
equation (4).   16
implicit subsidies to the Swedish construction sector.
19 These developments can drive changes 
in the wage dispersion indexes, independently of any role for wage-setting institutions per se, 
by shifting the distribution of employment towards industries with relatively high or low 
degrees of wage dispersion.  As shown in the Appendix, Construction ranks number 20 out of 
61 industries in terms of the dispersion in residual log wages. Public Administration and 
Welfare Services rank 44th and 39th, respectively. Thus, the declining share of employment 
in the Construction sector, and the rising shares in Public Administration and Welfare 
Services sectors contribute to a decline in Sweden’s wage dispersion index. 
The bottom panel in Table 6 reports results based on a subset of industries that excludes 
Construction, Public Administration and Welfare Services. Here, the most important message 
is that, even after excluding these industries, Sweden experienced a relative decline in the 
index of residual wage dispersion.  The relative decline in the Swedish index of residual wage 
dispersion in the bottom panel is about 80 percent as large as in the top panel. 
 
4. Wage Structure and the Industry Distribution 
 
4.1 Hypotheses and Regression Specifications 
We now consider multivariate regression models designed to quantify how the wage structure 
relates to U.S.-Swedish differences in the industry distribution of employment. We examine 
three empirical issues regarding these differences and their evolution over time: (i) the 
explanatory role of between-industry and within-industry aspects of wage dispersion, (ii) 
asymmetric responses to above-average and below-average levels of industry mean wages, 
and (iii) differential responses to predicted and residual components of wage dispersion.  
Our earlier discussions lead to four hypotheses about wage structure effects on the 
industry distribution: 
H1 = Relative to the U.S. distribution, the Swedish employment distribution tilts away from 
industries with below-average and above-average wage levels. 
                                                           
19 Subsidies to the construction sector take several forms: below-market interest rates for the renovation of 
existing buildings and for new residential construction, a preferred treatment of structures under credit market 
regulations, and a preferred treatment of housing relative to other forms of wealth accumulation by the individual 
income tax system. By virtue of these interventions, after-tax real interest rates of minus 8 percent on 30-50 year 
mortgages were not unusual in the 1970s and 1980s. Turner (1990, 1999) provides a detailed description of 
Swedish interest rate subsidies; Davis and Henrekson (1999) describe some of the pertinent credit market 
regulations and tax code provisions. It is clear from these descriptions that the overall magnitude of the subsidies 
declined after the 1980s.   17
H2 = The relative tilt in the Swedish industry distribution is more pronounced for industries 
with below-average than above-average wages. 
H3 = Relative to the U.S. distribution, the Swedish employment distribution tilts away from 
industries with high wage dispersion among workers. 
H4 = The tilt in the Swedish industry distribution is more sensitive to residual wage dispersion 
among workers than to dispersion generated by easily observed worker characteristics. 
To investigate the first three hypotheses, Table 7 reports regressions of U.S.-Swedish 
differences in industry-level employment shares on three wage structure variables:  
Shortfall = max{0, Aggregate Mean Log Wage – Industry Mean Log Wage} 
Excess = max{0, Industry Mean Log Wage – Aggregate Mean Log Wage} 
Within Dispersion = Standard Deviation in Mean Log Wages Among Workers  
      in the Industry 
These variables capture key aspects of the between-industry and within-industry wage 
structure in a simple manner. We compute these industry-level wage structure measures from 
U.S. Current Population Survey data on individual workers. Unless otherwise noted, we 
compute the wage variables from a pooled three-year sample of workers centered on 1985. 
See the Appendix for details. Panel A in Table 7 considers specifications in which the 
dependent variable equals the difference between the U.S. and Swedish log employment 
shares. Panel B considers specifications in which the dependent variable equals the time 
difference of the U.S.-Swedish difference in log employment shares. 
 
4.2 Wage Structure Effects on the Industry Distribution 
Section 2 characterizes Swedish wage-setting institutions as an increasingly powerful agent 
for wage compression from the 1960s until 1983. Given this characterization and allowing for 
response lags, we anticipate the largest effects of the wage structure variables on industry 
distribution outcomes in the middle 1980s. Hence, in evaluating the wage structure effects in 
the cross-sectional regressions we focus on results for 1985 and nearby years. 
The results in Table 7 support hypotheses ,   and  . In the 1985 cross-sectional 
regression, for example, all three wage structure variables enter with the predicted sign in a 
statistically significant manner. In line with , the coefficient on Shortfall is roughly twice 
as large as the coefficient on Excess. The same pattern of results holds in the 1975, 1980, 
1990 and 1994 cross-sectional regressions, but the Excess variable is statistically significant 
only in 1985 and 1990. 
1 H 2 H 3 H
2 H
To assess the magnitude of these effects, consider the implied industry distribution 
response to a unit standard deviation change in each wage structure variable. To place the   18
estimated responses in perspective, recall from Table 1 that the average absolute difference 
between the U.S. and Swedish employment shares equals .54 log points in the 1985 cross 
section. Multiplying the 1985 slope coefficients in Table 7 by the regressor standard 
deviations, we generate responses in the dependent variable of .225 for Excess, .583 for 
Shortfall and .230 for Within Dispersion.
20 These are large effects. Taking antilogs, they 
correspond to industry employment shares that are 25, 79 and 26 percent larger, respectively, 
in the United States than in Sweden. 
The Table 7 regressions use time-invariant wage structure variables computed from a 
sample of U.S. workers centered on 1985. To investigate whether our results are sensitive to 
this choice, we reran the regressions using wage structure variables constructed from 1975, 
1994 and time-varying contemporaneous data. In each case, the (unreported) results are 
highly similar to the ones in Table 7. We conclude that our results do not depend on which 
year we choose to construct the U.S.-based wage structure measures. We also reran the 
regressions on a subsample that excludes the Construction, Public Administration and 
Welfare industries, obtaining results highly similar to the ones reported in Table 7. 
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of Table 7 is the evidence that centralized wage 
setting tilted the Swedish employment distribution away from high-wage industries. For given 
labor inputs, wage compression at the top end means bigger cost reductions for industries that 
more intensively use high-skill, high-wage labor. If the supply of high-wage labor is perfectly 
inelastic, then wage compression at the top end could raise employment shares in high-wage 
industries as employers respond to lower costs for high-wage workers by expanding the use of 
less skilled, lower wage workers. In fact, Table 7 shows the opposite response pattern. 
There are at least two issues here: First, how elastic is the supply of high-wage labor? 
Second, how does a given change in the supply of high-wage labor affect marginal cost and 
industry employment? On the first question, Davis and Henrekson (2001) show that wage 
compression involved a sharp twist in the hours distribution away from workers in the higher 
deciles of the Swedish wage distribution, as compared to contemporaneous developments in 
the U.S. One can question why this twist occurred, but it coincided with the heyday of 
centralized wage setting, and it ended, even reversed course somewhat, with the demise of 
centralized bargaining.  On the second question, a simple analysis shows that the marginal 
cost of production is more sensitive to the supply of high-wage labor in industries that more 
                                                           
20 The regressor standard deviations are .1065 for Excess, .1432 for Shortfall and .0409 for Within Dispersion. 
As in the regression itself, we use the simple average of the U.S. and Swedish employment shares to calculate 
these weighted standard deviations. The corresponding statistics reported in Appendix Table A.1. differ slightly, 
because they are calculated using U.S. weights.   19
intensively use high-wage labor. Under reasonable conditions, the bigger impact on marginal 
cost leads to a bigger employment reduction.  Hence, wage compression can lower 
employment shares in high-wage industries, and the evidence is consistent with this outcome. 
We should also note that hours worked, although relatively easy to measure, is not the 
only important dimension of labor supply. In particular, wage compression at the top end can 
lower the effective supply of high-wage labor along many dimensions including work 
intensity, willingness to undergo voluntary on-the-job-training, propensity to assume more 
demanding tasks, extent of unrecorded overtime, willingness to make short-term sacrifices to 
meet idiosyncratic employer demands, and the degree to which workers strive for on-the-job 
consumption in the form of lax working conditions. See Lindbeck (1997) for a discussion of 
these issues. Many authors, including Edin and Topel (1997) and Henrekson and Rosenberg 
(2001), argue that wage compression discourages schooling and other forms of human capital 
accumulation in Sweden, which also lowers the supply of highly skilled labor. 
 
4.3 The Timing of Industry Distribution Responses 
The empirical evidence in Table 7 also supports the timing hypotheses implied by the rise and 
fall of centralized wage-setting arrangements. In this regard, note first that the results show no 
significant effect of wage structure variables on U.S.-Swedish differences in the industry 
distribution before 1970. This result shows up, for example, in the form of very low 
2 R  
values in the 1960 and 1970 cross-sectional regressions and in the 1960-70 difference 
regression. 
In contrast, after 1970 the wage structure variables explain a large fraction of U.S.-
Swedish differences in the industry distribution and in the evolution of those differences over 
time. In the cross-sectional regressions, the adjusted 
2 R  rises from zero in 1970 to a peak of 
.36 in 1985 and 1990. In the difference regressions, the wage structure variables account for 
about one-third of the evolution of U.S.-Swedish differences over the 1960–85, 1970–85 and 
1970-90 intervals. The coefficients in the 1975–85 difference regression are nearly one-half as 
large as the corresponding coefficients in the 1985 cross-section. These results indicate that 
the wage compression achieved by Swedish wage-setting institutions caused large shifts in the 
Swedish industry distribution in the period from 1970 to 1985 or 1990. 
Table 7 also provides clear evidence of a partial unwinding of these effects after 1985. 
In this regard, note that the coefficient signs switch in the 1985-90, 1985-94 and 1990-94 
regressions relative to the other difference regressions. The 1985-94 regression has an   20
adjusted 
2 R  value of .21. The cross-sectional regressions show a flat 
2 R  value from 1985 to 
1990, but the coefficients on the between-industry wage structure variables begin to decline 
after 1985. These results support the view that the unraveling of centralized wage-setting 
arrangements strongly contributed to a reversal in the evolution of the Swedish industry 
distribution after 1985. 
In summary, Table 7 indicates that wage structure effects explain about one-third of the 
relative industry employment shifts between the two countries from 1970 to 1985 and about 
one-fifth of the relative industry employment shifts during the reversal from 1985 to 1994. 
The timing of these wage structure effects on the industry distribution coincides with or 
somewhat lags the growing strength and subsequent demise of Sweden’s centralized wage-
setting institutions.
21 
We regard the broadly coincident timing of these developments as strong evidence in 
favor of our “institutional” interpretation of the estimated wage structure effects on the 
industry distribution and strong evidence against the view that these effects somehow reflect 
between-country differences in the skill mix of the workforce. Even if one concocts a 
plausible explanation for the cross-sectional relationship between the wage structure variables 
and U.S.-Swedish differences in the industry distribution, there is no evidence that the skill 
mix of the Swedish (or U.S.) workforce changed in the right direction or sufficiently rapidly 
to account for the estimated divergence from 1970 to 1985 and the subsequent reversal from 
1985 to 1994. An interpretation of Table 7 based on differential relative demand shifts is also 
strained. The omitted relative demand shifters would have to be correlated with the included 
wage structure regressors in just the right way to produce the effects predicted by ,   and 
and to evolve over time in the right way to fit the timing hypotheses. 
1 H 2 H
3 H
                                                           
21 Our results suggest a later onset of industry distribution responses to the rise of centralized wage setting than 
Edin and Topel (1997). In this regard, we offer several observations. First, the point estimates in Table 8 suggest 
effects that date back to 1960. This is most easily seen in Figures 2 and 3 below, which show that the regressions 
imply a divergence between the U.S. and Swedish industry distributions that began in 1960 (or earlier). We do 
not emphasize this finding, because we cannot conclude with much confidence that the effects are present that 
early on. Second, much of the evidence on industry structure responses in Edin-Topel is based on data for the 
manufacturing sector only. Centralized wage setting arose first among blue-collar workers. As we discussed in 
Section 2, wage setting among public sector and white-collar workers did not become fully centralized until 
1970–71. Hence, it is not surprising that the effects show up sooner in the manufacturing sector. Third, we use a 
difference-in-difference approach, so that the benchmark becomes the contemporaneous U.S. evolution rather 
than Sweden's own past. Hence, common shocks that cause similar changes in both countries are conditioned out 
in our study but not in Edin-Topel. Fourth, we relate industry evolution to time-invariant hourly wage structure 
variables constructed from U.S. data, whereas Edin-Topel relate industry evolution to time-varying measures of 
Swedish after-tax earnings for those who work at least 20 hours per week. Finally, it appears from their footnote 
21 that the industry structure results in Edin-Topel are based on data for men only, whereas ours are based on 
men plus women. This last difference alone might be quite important given the strong segregation of Swedish 
women into certain industries and occupations.   21
 
4.4 Predicted Versus Residual Wage Dispersion 
Table 8 reports regressions that distinguish between residual and predicted components of the 
wage structure. Recall that hypothesis   pertains to the distinction between the Within-
Industry Dispersion of residual and predicted wages, but we also consider the employment 
distribution responses to the Excess and Shortfall of predicted and residual mean industry 
wages. 
4 H
Table 8 delivers a mixed verdict with respect to . The coefficients on the Within 
Dispersion of residual wages have the predicted sign in the cross-section and first-difference 
regressions (except for the 1960–70 regression), and some are statistically significant or 
nearly so. However, they are typically smaller than the imprecisely estimated coefficients on 
the Within Dispersion of predicted wages, significantly so in the 1970 cross section, which 
violates . For the 1960-85, 1970–85, 1970–90, 1975–85 and 1980–85 differencing 
intervals, there is a positive and sometimes statistically significant difference between the 
coefficients on residual and predicted Within Dispersion, as required by . However, the 





We also examined the industry distribution response to the Within Dispersion variables 
in other specifications. Cross-section and first-difference specifications that contain only the 
predicted and residual Within Dispersion variables tell essentially the same story as Table 6. 
Specifications that contain the Excess and Shortfall of predicted and residual wages plus the 
raw Within Dispersion variable tell essentially the same story as Table 7. 
These results lead us to three conclusions: First, Sweden’s relative employment 
distribution drifted towards industries with low residual wage dispersion between 1970 and 
1990 (Table 6 and unreported results). Second, controlling for between-industry aspects of the 
wage structure, there is a clear-cut independent effect of Within Dispersion on the industry 
distribution of employment (Table 7 and unreported results). Third, controlling for between-
industry aspects of the wage structure, the data do not precisely distinguish between the 
effects of residual and predicted Within Dispersion (Table 8 and unreported results). 
The data speak somewhat more loudly about the employment distribution responses to 
between-industry aspects of the residual and predicted wage structure. Most notably, the 
cross-section results in Table 8 show much larger responses to the Shortfall in predicted   22
wages than in residual wages. These differences are statistically significant at the 3 percent 
confidence level in every cross-sectional regression. A similar pattern holds with respect to 
the Excess predicted and residual log wages, but the Excess predicted wage effects are 
imprecisely estimated, and the differences between the predicted and residual effects are 
typically insignificant. 
 
4.5 Explaining Movements in the Overall Distance 
Figures 2 and 3 show the distance between U.S. and Swedish industry distributions according 
to two of the metrics considered earlier in Table 1. In Figure 2, the metric is the weighted 
standard deviation of between-country differences in the log industry employment shares. The 
weight on each industry-level observation equals the contemporaneous simple mean of the 
U.S. and Swedish employment shares, as in the regressions. This metric corresponds to the 
minimand underlying the weighted least squares estimation. In Figure 3, the metric is the 
weighted mean of absolute differences in the log employment shares. 
The figures show the evolution of the distance metrics from 1960 to 1994 based on 
actual data and based on fitted values from two regression specifications.
22 The “basic” 
specification contains Shortfall, Excess and Within Dispersion and is identical to the cross-
sectional regressions reported in Panel A of Table 7. The “expanded” specification breaks out 
the predicted and residual components of Shortfall and Excess but, in line with the results in 
Table 8, does not decompose Within Dispersion. 
The two figures tell similar stories. The “fitted” distance between the U.S. and Swedish 
industry distributions expands greatly from 1960 to 1985. This expansion is partly reversed 
from 1985 to 1994. From 1980 to 1994, the direction and magnitude of changes in the fitted 
distance are similar to those based on actual values, highly similar in Figure 2. Under our 
interpretation of the regression results, this finding implies that wage-setting developments 
are essentially the whole story behind movements from 1980 to 1994 in the overall distance 
between U.S. and Swedish industry distributions. 
Prior to 1980, the “fitted” divergence is rapid, whereas the actual divergence is modest 
or nonexistent. This contrast implies that some unmeasured force counteracted the influence 
of wage-setting institutions and prevented the Swedish and U.S. distributions from more 
rapidly diverging before 1975 or 1980. A natural conjecture is that worker skill distributions 
                                                           
22 We use the same degrees of freedom correction for metrics based on actual and fitted data, which slightly 
overstates model fit.   23
became more similar over time in the two countries, which would tend to bring the two 
industry distributions closer together. Alternatively, other aspects of factor endowments or 
technologies may have become more similar. An evaluation of these conjectures lies beyond 
the scope of this study. 
 
5. Summary and Implications 
 
Wage-setting institutions can exert a profound influence on the structure of relative wages, 
but few previous studies trace out the consequences of institutional pressures on the wage 
structure for the allocation of workers among industries. This study develops evidence that 
these institutional pressures have important effects on factor allocations. In particular, the 
empirical results identify the rise and fall of centralized wage-setting arrangements in Sweden 
as a major factor in the evolution of its industry structure. 
It is useful to recount the main elements of the story. Swedish wage differentials 
narrowed sharply after the middle 1960s, as centralized wage-setting arrangements spread 
through the economy. In the wake of this development, the U.S. and Swedish employment 
distributions diverged from the early 1970s until the middle or late 1980s. When the 
dissolution of Sweden’s centralized wage-setting arrangements commenced in 1983, wage 
differentials began to expand almost immediately. By the late 1980s, the collapse of 
centralized wage setting was complete, and wage differentials continued to expand. The next 
several years saw a marked reversal in the evolution of Sweden’s industry distribution as it 
lurched back toward the U.S. distribution. The empirical relationship between the U.S. wage 
structure and U.S.-Swedish differences in the industry distribution conforms to several 
hypotheses about the impact of centralized wage setting. The timing and nature of the 
evolution in U.S.-Swedish differences during the sharp divergence and abrupt reversal also 
support these hypotheses.  
The institutionally induced wage structure effects on the Swedish industry distribution 
are large in three respects. First, at their peak, they account for 40 percent of industry-by-
industry differences in the U.S. and Swedish employment distributions. Second, during the 
1980-94 period of rapid divergence and partial reversal, the evolution in the fitted distance 
between the U.S. and Swedish distributions closely mirrors the evolution in the actual 
distance. Third, the estimated wage structure coefficients imply big effects on the industry 
distribution. As of 1985, the relative U.S. employment share is 25 percent larger for an   24
industry with a mean wage one standard deviation above the aggregate mean wage, 79 percent 
larger for an industry with a mean wage one standard deviation below the aggregate mean, 
and 26 percent larger when the within-industry wage dispersion exceeds its average value by 
one standard deviation.  
We read these results as highly supportive of the view encapsulated in the quotation at 
the paper’s outset. We also read them as indicative of an important role for wage-setting 
institutions in shaping the industry structure in other countries. In this regard, many European 
countries share important elements of the centralized arrangements that dominated the 
Swedish wage formation process until 1983 (Blau and Kahn, 1999). Wage setting became 
more decentralized in a few countries during the 1980s or 1990s (Katz, 1993) and more 
centralized in at least one country ─ Norway (Kahn, 1998). Australia, Italy and Norway have 
experienced pronounced changes in the importance of centralized wage-setting institutions in 
recent decades.
23 These countries, and perhaps others, provide fertile ground for further 
empirical study of how wage-setting institutions affect industry structure. 
If wage-setting institutions play a major role in shaping national industry structures, 
they probably affect other aspects of factor allocation and business organization as well. In 
this regard, there are good reasons to suspect that the size distribution of employment is 
strongly influenced by wage-setting institutions. An extensive literature consistently finds 
higher wages at larger employers, even after exhaustive efforts to control for observable 
worker characteristics and other job attributes.
24 This well-established empirical regularity 
suggests that wage compression raises relative labor costs for smaller employers. The 
relationship between employer size and wage dispersion is much less explored, but a study of 
the U.S. manufacturing sector by Davis and Haltiwanger (1996) finds that wage dispersion 
declines with employer size. There is an especially pronounced negative relationship between 
employer size and wage dispersion after conditioning on standard human capital variables. 
This finding suggests that standard rate compensation policies of the sort that emerge from 
collective bargaining and centralized wage-setting arrangements are more inimical to the 
compensation structures preferred by smaller employers. Drawing on these and other 
observations, Davis and Henrekson (1999) compile several pieces of evidence that point to 
                                                           
23 See Erickson and Ichino (1995) on the Italian experience, Kahn (1998) on the Norwegian experience, and 
Gregory and Vella (1995) on the Australian experience. 
24 See Oi and Idson (1999) for a recent review.   25
institutionally induced wage compression as an important factor that disadvantages smaller 
firms and establishments relative to their larger rivals.
25 
The evidence regarding the industry and size distribution of employment points to 
powerful effects of wage-setting institutions on factor allocation and the output mix. This 
evidence supports the view that wage compression on the Swedish scale induces major 
distortions in the allocation of labor and capital across sectors. Of course, many writers stress 
the egalitarian consequences of wage compression (e.g., Björklund and Freeman, 1997) or the 
deleterious effects on worker incentives to acquire schooling and other general forms of 
human capital (e.g., Edin and Topel, 1997 and Henrekson and Rosenberg, 2001). But wage 
compression can favorably affect employer incentives to invest in human capital (e.g., 
Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999) or to upgrade the productivity and quality of jobs (e.g., Davis, 
2001). As these remarks indicate, institutionally induced wage compression can favorably and 
unfavorably affect welfare, investment and allocative efficiency along many dimensions. It 
seems fair to say that the net effects of wage compression on welfare and efficiency are open, 
and important, issues. 
 
 
                                                           
25 There is also a body of evidence on how collective bargaining and centralized wage-setting arrangements 
influence the employment of different demographic groups. This research focuses on less skilled workers. See 
Blau and Kahn (1999, 2002).   26
Data Appendix 
 
Swedish Data on Employment by Industry 
The Swedish employment-by-industry data cover all employment in the public and private 
sectors.  The data for 1970 and 1994 are based on the Swedish Labor Force Survey (AKU), a 
monthly survey covering about 10,000 individuals. The data for other years are based on the 
the  Folk- och Bostadsräkning (FOB), a comprehensive household census of all Swedish 
residents.  Our data from both sources are based on special tabulations performed by Statistics 
Sweden for the authors. See Appendix B in Davis and Henrekson (2001) for a list of the 
industries. Swedish employment data are unavailable for DH codes 9510 and 8329.2 in 1960. 
 
U.S. Data on Employment by Industry 
Our main sources for U.S. data on private-sector employment by industry are (i) the March 
figures in Employment and Earnings (Table B.12 for the 1994 data and Table B.2 for earlier 
years) and (ii) the March figures in County Business Patterns (CBP).  These sources are based 
on establishment-level surveys or administrative records. The Employment and Earnings (EE) 
data have broader industry coverage (with a few exceptions), but the CBP data often provide 
greater industry detail. The CBP and EE data exclude self-employed persons, agricultural 
production workers, domestic workers, military personnel and employees of the Central 
Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.  While EE covers most public sector 
employment in recent years, the data are too highly aggregated for our purposes. 
We supplemented the EE data for Agricultural Services (SIC 07) with Current 
Population Survey (CPS) data on “farm operators and managers” and “farm workers”, as 
reported in Table 649 of the 1995 Statistical Abstract of the United States for 1994 and 
comparable tables in earlier years. We obtained “Private Household” employment from CPS 
data, as reported in Table 649 in the 1995 Statistical Abstract of the United States and 
comparable tables in earlier years. 
We drew upon Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin 2307 (Table B-12) to add self-
employed persons in the following industry groups: Forestry and Fishing, Mining, 
Construction, Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, Health Services, Education, Entertainment and 
Recreation, FIRE, Personal Services (excluding domestic household), and Business Services 
and Repair.  These data are tabulated from the Current Population Survey (CPS), a household 
survey, and cover the period from 1975 to 1985.   27
We extended these data forward and backward in time and, in many cases, to a finer 
level of industry detail by using ratios of self-employment to other private sector employment 
within the same industry group.  Details are available upon request. 
Our main source for data on employment by industry in the public sector is Public 
Employment (PE).  We allocated government employment to particular industries as indicated 
in the notes to our U.S.-Swedish concordance. See Appendix B in Davis and Henrekson 
(2001). We relied upon Occupations of Federal White-Collar and Blue-Collar Workers to 
obtain federal government employment of scientists, engineers and architects. We obtained 
employment figures for the U.S. Department of Defense from Table 551 in the 1995 
Statistical Abstract of the United States entries labelled “DoD Military and Civilian 
Employment”, and comparable tables for earlier years. 
U.S. employment data are unavailable for DH code 8323 in 1960 and 1970. 
 
U.S. Data on Education and the Distribution of Wages by Industry 
We constructed these data from individual records in the Annual Demographic Files of the 
March Current Population Survey. Our samples contain workers 18-64 years of age and 
exclude students, persons in the military and persons with an hourly wage less than 75 percent 
of the federal minimum wage. We also excluded primarily self-employed persons in the 
calculation of wage statistics. Hourly wages equal annual earnings divided by annual hours 
worked. We handled top-coded earnings observations and the imputation of annual hours 
prior to 1975 in the same manner as Katz and Murphy (1992). We constructed time-consistent 
measures of educational attainment following Jaeger (1997). We pooled over two or three 
years to obtain larger samples. For example, the “1985” industry-level statistics are computed 
using data from wage years 1984 to 1986. 
We computed summary statistics and regression-based statistics on an hours-weighted 
basis. To generate predicted and residual wage observations, we regressed log real hourly 
wages on sex, years of schooling, four schooling class variables, years of schooling interacted 
with the schooling class variables, and a quartic in experience interacted with the other 
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   Table A.1.  Summary Statistics for Measures of Industry Characteristics  
     
             Weighted by 1985 U.S. Industry Employment Shares 
 
                Variable                         Mean         St. Dev. 
 
            Years of Schooling                   13.05          1.15      
            Mean Hourly Wage (1982 $)             8.88          1.90      
            Mean Log Hourly Wage                  2.01          0.23      
            Predicted Mean Log Wage               1.98          0.12      
            Residual Mean Log Wage               -0.03          0.14      
            Excess over Aggregate Log Wage        0.07          0.10 
            Shortfall from Aggregate Log Wage     0.11          0.16 
            Within-Industry Standard Deviation    0.55          0.04      
               of Log Wages 
            Within-Industry Standard Deviation,   0.32          0.027     
               Predicted Log Wages 
            Within-Industry Standard Deviation,   0.47          0.043     
               Residual Log Wages 
 
 
       Notes: 
 
         (1) All measures constructed from predicted and residual log wages 
             are based on the regression specification described in the  
             note to Table 5 as fit to CPS data on individual workers for 
             the earnings years 1984-1986. 
 
         (2) The regression specifications estimated in section 4 are 
             weighted by the simple average of the contemporaneous U.S. 
             and Swedish industry employment shares, so that the weighted 
             means and standard deviations differ somewhat from those  
             reported in this table.   33
 
                           Table A.2. Wage and Education Variables by Industry                         
 
                   Hours-Weighted Statistics Computed from Data on Individual Workers, 
                                U.S. Current Population Survey, 1984-1986                                              
                                    Sorted by Mean Log Wage (1982 $) 
 
                                                  Mean Log    Mean    St. Dev.  St. Dev. of  Mean Years 
                                                   Hourly   Residual   of Log     Residual       of 
     Industry                                       Wage    Log Wage    Wage      Log Wage    Schooling 
 Railway Transport                                  2.45       0.31     0.41        0.39        12.53   
 Legal Services                                     2.43       0.23     0.67        0.52        15.47   
 Engineering, Architectural, Technical Services     2.41       0.15     0.55        0.45        14.96   
 Computer and Data Processing                       2.41       0.22     0.56        0.49        15.05   
 Research and Scientific Institutes                 2.40       0.13     0.58        0.44        15.13   
 Electricity, Gas, Steam and Water Works            2.38       0.22     0.47        0.39        13.32   
 Postal Services                                    2.36       0.23     0.36        0.37        13.03   
 Business Management and Consulting                 2.34       0.09     0.73        0.64        15.28   
 Telecommunications                                 2.33       0.24     0.52        0.44        13.65   
 Manufacture of Transportation Equipment            2.32       0.20     0.51        0.41        12.92   
 Advertising Services                               2.31       0.13     0.69        0.57        14.68   
 Mining                                             2.29       0.20     0.56        0.48        12.81   
 National Defense                                   2.28       0.11     0.49        0.39        13.83   
 Accounting and Auditing                            2.27       0.11     0.60        0.49        15.01   
 Air Transport                                      2.27       0.20     0.64        0.54        13.46   
 Manufacture of Nonelectrical Machinery             2.26       0.15     0.54        0.43        13.08   
 Water Transport                                    2.26       0.19     0.66        0.60        12.73   
 Chemicals, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber, Plastics       2.23       0.13     0.58        0.44        13.03   
 Manuf. of Professional, Scientific Instruments     2.21       0.15     0.54        0.41        13.25   
 Basic (Primary) Metal Industries                   2.21       0.14     0.46        0.40        12.15   
 Public Administration                              2.20       0.03     0.53        0.44        14.09   
 Manufacture of Pulp and Paper Products             2.19       0.13     0.51        0.41        12.37   
 Fire Protection                                    2.19       0.05     0.44        0.41        13.20   
 Insurance                                          2.17       0.13     0.58        0.48        13.88   
 Manufacture of Electrical Machinery                2.17       0.11     0.57        0.42        13.13   
 Financial institutions                             2.17       0.12     0.62        0.49        14.06   
 Police and Security Services                       2.12       0.04     0.53        0.47        13.38   
 Wholesale Trade                                    2.10       0.02     0.60        0.51        13.14   
 Construction                                       2.10       0.07     0.58        0.51        12.09   
 Printing and Publishing                            2.10       0.04     0.57        0.49        13.34    
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                          Table A.2 (continued) Wage and Education Variables by Industry           
 
                                                 Mean Log     Mean    St. Dev.   St. Dev. of  Mean Years 
                                                  Hourly    Residual   of Log      Residual       of 
    Industry                                       Wage     Log Wage    Wage       Log Wage    Schooling 
 Sanitary Services                                  2.09       0.03     0.50        0.44        12.11   
 Stone, Clay and Glass Products                     2.08       0.07     0.50        0.41        11.95   
 Education Services                                 2.07      -0.12     0.59        0.49        15.31   
 Fabricated Metals, exc. Machinery and Equipment    2.04       0.03     0.53        0.44        12.05   
 Business,Professional and Labor Associations       2.04      -0.04     0.70        0.61        14.38   
 Medical, Dental, and Health Services               2.04       0.04     0.59        0.48        13.85 
 Welfare Services                                   2.02      -0.09     0.54        0.45        14.41   
 Freight Transport by Road                          2.02       0.01     0.54        0.50        12.34   
 Forestry and Logging                               1.97      -0.09     0.56        0.47        12.58   
 Local and Interurban Passenger Transport           1.97      -0.06     0.56        0.54        12.46   
 Typing, Duplicating, and Copying Services          1.97      -0.05     0.65        0.56        13.40   
 Business Services n.e.c.                           1.97      -0.05     0.65        0.56        13.40   
 Business Machinery Rental and Leasing              1.97      -0.05     0.65        0.56        13.40   
 Manufacture of Food, Beverages, Tobacco            1.96      -0.01     0.54        0.45        11.84   
 Real Estate                                        1.95      -0.08     0.65        0.58        12.94   
 Fishing and Hunting                                1.94      -0.09     0.65        0.63        12.91   
 Recreational and Cultural Services                 1.94      -0.09     0.67        0.58        13.34   
 Lumber, Wood Products and Furniture                1.88      -0.06     0.50        0.45        11.48   
 Repair Services, n.e.c.                            1.87      -0.08     0.57        0.54        11.96   
 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries             1.87      -0.08     0.56        0.47        11.92   
 Retail Trade                                       1.78      -0.15     0.55        0.49        12.73   
 Religious, Political and Social Organizations      1.74      -0.44     0.54        0.60        14.92   
 Hotels and Lodging                                 1.70      -0.18     0.52        0.48        12.17   
 Manufacture of Textiles, Apparel, Leather          1.69      -0.13     0.53        0.44        11.07   
 Parking Services                                   1.67      -0.18     0.55        0.52        12.67   
 Other Supprting Services to Land Transport         1.67      -0.18     0.55        0.52        12.67   
 Other Personal Services                            1.67      -0.18     0.55        0.52        12.67   
 Laundries and Cleaning Services                    1.58      -0.24     0.46        0.44        11.38   
 Agriculture                                        1.57      -0.28     0.55        0.54        10.89   
 Eating and Drinking Establishments                 1.55      -0.22     0.51        0.49        11.95   
 Private Household Workers                          1.38      -0.25     0.51        0.51        10.54   
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               Table 1.  Measures of Distance Between the U.S. and Swedish    
                         Distributions of Employment by Industry, 1960-1994 
                                
               Weighted Mean    Sum of Absolute   Standard Deviation 
                of Absolute         Share          of Log Employment 
              Log Differences    Differences       Share Differences 
       Year     (times 100)      (times 100)         (times 100) 
       1960        47.0             43.7              62.8 
       1965          .                .                 . 
       1970        45.9             42.8              61.7 
       1975        46.9             43.9              61.0 
       1980        47.0             43.3              65.0 
       1985        54.0             47.5              83.3 
       1990        54.2             49.1              75.3 
       1994        48.4             44.0              69.9 
   
      Notes:  
          (1) Based on a 61-industry concordance constructed by the authors 
              and described in Davis and Henrekson (2001). 
          (2) In calculating the mean absolute difference in log employment  
              shares and the standard deviation of the log employment share  
              differences, each industry observation is weighted by the simple 
              average of its employment share in the two countries. 
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     Table 2. Intensity of Change in the Industry Distribution of Employment   
                     Sweden and the United States, 1960 to 1994 
                      Expressed as Five-Year Rates of Change 
 
           Weighted Mean of      Sum of Absolute      Weighted Standard 
           Absolute Log          Employment Share     Deviation of Log 
           Employment Changes       Changes           Employment Share                     
                                                         Changes  
           Sweden    United      Sweden   United      Sweden    United                    
Time                 States               States                States 
Interval 
1960-65     16.7      12.6        24.2     15.6         19.8     13.1 
1965-70     16.7      19.0        24.2     18.3         19.8     16.0 
1970-75     17.1      13.8        27.5     21.4         24.5     16.1 
1975-80     13.1      17.4        22.2     16.5         17.5     12.7 
1980-85     11.8      10.8        19.1     13.9         18.2     12.9 
1985-90     12.4      14.7        17.0     15.1         14.4     12.7 
1990-94     20.8      8.6         26.0     14.2         22.1     11.7 
Cumulative  108.6     96.9        160.2    114.9        136.3    95.2 
 
     Notes:  
         (1) In calculating the weighted statistics, each industry observation 
             is weighted by the simple average of own-country employment 
             in the initial and terminal years of the time interval. 
         (2) Since we lack 1965 data for Sweden, the 1960-65 and 1965-70 rates 
             of change for Sweden are calculated as half the 1960-70 change. 
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         Table 3.  Employment Share Differences by Major Industry Group,             
                   Sweden and the United States, 1960 to 1994 
 
               U.S. Employment Share Minus Swedish Employment Share 
 
                       Lodging                                     Defense 
                         and      Personal    Business               and 
      Year    Trade     Dining    Services    Services    FIRE    Security 
      1960     4.6       1.7         2.1         0.9       2.4       3.7   
      1965      .         .           .           .         .         .    
      1970     3.6       2.3         2.0         1.3       2.2       3.3   
      1975     4.1       3.5         1.8         0.9       2.4       2.5   
      1980     4.5       4.5         2.0         1.1       2.0       1.8   
      1985     5.2       4.7         2.8         2.3       2.4       2.0   
      1990     5.0       4.8         2.1         1.8       2.6       1.7   
      1994     3.9       4.9         2.3         2.6       2.1       1.5   
                                                               
                                                                 
                                                      Public Admin., 
                                                      Welfare, Health   All 
Year    Manufacturing   Construction  Transportation  And Education     Other 
1960       -9.1            -4.9            0.0             2.3          -3.8 
1965         .               .              .               .             .  
1970       -4.3            -5.0           -1.1            -1.3          -3.0 
1975       -6.6            -2.9           -0.9            -2.9          -2.0 
1980       -3.5            -1.7           -1.0            -7.2          -2.6 
1985       -4.8            -1.3           -1.2            -9.9          -2.0 
1990       -5.2            -1.9           -0.8            -8.4          -1.8 
1994       -4.4            -0.9           -0.9            -8.7          -2.5 
 
Note: Davis and Henrekson (2001) describes the detailed industry concordance  
      that underlies the major industry groups. Personal Services contains  
      DH codes 9510-9590, Business Services contains DH codes 8321-8330,   
      Defense and Security contains 9101-9102, FIRE contains 8100-8310,  
      Public Administration, Health, Education and Welfare Services contains  
      9101 and 9310-9340. 
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   Table 4.  Weighted Mean Years of Schooling in the United States and Sweden 
 
        Weights: Own-Country Contemporaneous Industry Employment Shares 
        Schooling Measure: Years of Schooling Among U.S. Workers in 1984-86 
   
                  All Industries               Excluding Public Administration 
                                                   and Welfare Services 
             United                             United 
Year         States    Sweden   Difference      States    Sweden  Difference 
1960          12.66     12.45       0.20         12.61     12.41       0.21    
1965          12.75       .          .           12.71       .          .      
1970          12.89     12.75       0.14         12.86     12.65       0.20    
1975          12.99     12.92       0.07         12.95     12.80       0.14    
1980          13.01     13.04      -0.04         12.96     12.92       0.05    
1985          13.06     13.13      -0.08         13.02     12.99       0.03    
1990          13.12     13.15      -0.03         13.08     13.00       0.08    
1994          13.16     13.24      -0.09         13.11     13.09       0.02    
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   Table 5.  Weighted Mean of Industry Wages in the United States and Sweden 
 
      Weights: Contemporaneous Industry Employment Shares 
      Wage Measure: Industry Mean Log Wage Among U.S. Workers in 1984-86 
           
 
                                                  Difference      Difference 
               United              Difference    in Predicted    in Residual 
       Year    States    Sweden       X 100       Wages X 100    Wages X 100 
       1960     1.99      2.01        -1.51          -0.83          -0.80    
       1965     2.00       .            .              .              .      
       1970     2.01      2.03        -1.85          -1.19          -0.87    
       1975     2.01      2.05        -3.96          -2.21          -1.87    
       1980     2.01      2.05        -3.92          -2.64          -1.38    
       1985     2.01      2.06        -5.52          -3.44          -2.25    
       1990     2.01      2.06        -5.10          -3.25          -2.18    
       1994     2.00      2.05        -4.89          -3.29          -1.93    
 
Note: The predicted and residual log wage measures are based on an hours-
weighted least squares regression of the log hourly wage on dummy variables for 
year, sex and four educational attainment categories, years of schooling 
interacted with the four schooling categories and a quartic polynomial in 
experience fully interacted with the other variables (except year). See the 
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Table 6.  Mean Within-Industry Wage Dispersion in the United States and Sweden    
 
      Weights: Own Contemporaneous Industry Employment Shares  
      Dispersion Measure: Within-Industry Standard Deviation of Log Wages 
 
                                                 Difference,    Difference, 
             United                              St. Dev.        St. Dev. 
             States    Sweden    Difference    of Predicted    of Residual 
     Year     X 100     x 100       X 100          Wages          Wages 
     1960     54.06     53.98       0.08            0.21          -0.13    
     1965     54.20       .          .               .              .      
     1970     54.36     54.36       0.00            0.25          -0.20    
     1975     54.52     54.42       0.10            0.08           0.22    
     1980     54.63     54.54       0.09           -0.05           0.25    
     1985     54.86     54.48       0.38           -0.03           0.79    
     1990     55.09     54.52       0.58            0.07           0.83    
     1994     55.26     54.71       0.55           -0.07           0.80    
 
 
        Excluding Construction, Public Administration and Welfare Services 
 
                                                Difference,    Difference, 
            United                              St. Dev.        St. Dev. 
            States    Sweden    Difference    of Predicted    of Residual 
    Year     X 100     x 100       X 100          Wages          Wages 
    1960     53.86     53.59       0.27           0.10            0.11    
    1965     53.99       .          .              .               .      
    1970     54.19     54.05       0.14           0.23           -0.03    
    1975     54.37     54.22       0.15           0.15            0.28    
    1980     54.48     54.44       0.04           0.05            0.19    
    1985     54.74     54.40       0.34           0.14            0.74    
    1990     55.00     54.47       0.53           0.23            0.79    
    1994     55.20     54.78       0.42           0.10            0.64    
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           Table 7.   Industry-Level Regressions on Wage Structure Variables by Year            
                                                         
                                    A. Cross-Sectional Regressions by Year 
                   Dependent Variable: log(U.S. Employment Share/Swedish Employment Share) 
 
           Excess             Shortfall           Within-Industry          Standard             Test: 
         over Agg.  Standard  from Agg.  Standard  St. Dev. of   Standard  Error of  Adjusted   Excess = 
   Year   Log Wage    Error    Log Wage    Error     Log Wage      Error   Residual  R-squared  Shortfall 
   1960     0.09      0.98       0.41      0.56        0.16        2.48      0.850     -0.042    .69 
   1970     0.77      0.90       0.98      0.58        0.62        2.22      0.804     -0.004    .80 
   1975     0.63      0.82       1.79*     0.57        1.72        2.03      0.740      0.121    .12 
   1980     1.48      0.83       2.54*     0.59        2.64        2.01      0.747      0.219    .17 
   1985     2.11*     0.95       4.07*     0.70        5.62*       2.29      0.869      0.364    .03 
   1990     1.90*     0.86       3.63*     0.64        6.35*       2.02      0.785      0.364    .04 
   1994     1.17      0.83       3.03*     0.61        4.94*       1.93      0.763      0.291    .02 
 
                                    B. First-Difference Regressions    
                    Dependent Variable: Change in log(U.S. Employment Share/Swedish Employment Share) 
 
            Excess             Shortfall           Within-Industry           Standard            Test: 
           over Agg. Standard  from Agg.  Standard   St. Dev. of   Standard  Error of  Adjusted  Excess = 
  Interval  Log Wage   Error   Log Wage    Error       Log Wage      Error   Residual  R-squared Shortfall 
  1960-70    0.25      0.38      0.25      0.22         -1.60        0.95     0.329     0.044     1.00 
  1960-85    1.55      1.11      3.72*     0.69          1.98        2.77     0.981     0.348      .03 
  1970-85    0.84      0.87      3.02*     0.59          3.00        2.11     0.781     0.324      .01 
  1970-90    0.51      0.69      2.38*     0.47          3.31*       1.66     0.619     0.321      .00 
  1975-85    0.98      0.59      1.92*     0.42          2.46        1.45     0.539     0.256      .09 
  1975-90    0.68      0.44      1.39*     0.31          2.82*       1.05     0.397     0.264      .08 
  1980-85    0.34      0.42      1.15*     0.30          2.13*       1.01     0.379     0.228      .04 
  1980-90    0.05      0.32      0.68*     0.23          2.44*       0.76     0.288     0.231      .04 
  1985-90   -0.30      0.22     -0.39*     0.16          0.26        0.52     0.200     0.098      .64 
  1985-94   -0.99*     0.34     -0.96*     0.25         -1.17        0.82     0.317     0.207      .94 
  1990-94   -0.66*     0.26     -0.53*     0.19         -1.41*       0.60     0.235     0.128      .59 
 
  Notes: 
    (1) All regressions include an intercept. 
    (2) Each regression contains 61 observations except as follows: samples that include 1970 (1960) 
        data contain only 60 (58) observations. 
    (3) All regressions estimated by weighted least squares with the weight for each observation set to  
        the simple average of U.S. and Swedish employment shares in the indicated year or interval.    42
    (4) The wage structure regressors are computed from U.S. Current Population Survey data in 1984-86. 
    (5) An asterisk denotes a coefficient that differs from zero at the 95 percent confidence level. 
    (6) The rightmost column reports the marginal significance level in an F-test of the null  
        hypothesis that the coefficients on Excess and Shortfall are equal. 
 
   43
  Table 8. Industry-Level Regressions on Wage Structure Variables by Year, Predicted and Residual Components 
                                                              
                                    A. Cross-Sectional Regressions by Year 
Dependent Variable: log(U.S. Employment Share/Swedish Employment Share) 
 
                                    Shortfall      Shortfall 
        Excess        Excess           in             in          W/I SD of      W/I SD of    
       Predicted     Residual       Predicted       Residual      Predicted       Residual      Adjusted 
Year     Wage   S.E.   Wage   S.E.    Wage   S.E.     Wage  S.E.    Wages   S.E.   Wages  S.E.  R-squared 
1960     6.50   3.64   -0.15  1.58    3.95*  1.58    -2.73  1.67     6.27   3.73    1.12  2.21    0.029   
1970     5.99   3.16    0.95  1.43    4.56*  1.35    -1.90  1.48     7.49*  3.25   -0.37  1.94    0.130   
1975     6.79*  2.90    0.51  1.30    5.21*  1.24    -1.53  1.37     4.76   3.02    0.76  1.81    0.238   
1980     6.17   2.95    1.42  1.34    6.10*  1.23    -1.81  1.35     3.98   3.11    1.19  1.83    0.308   
1985     7.45*  3.60    1.83  1.65    7.32*  1.49    -1.74  1.68     3.63   3.77    4.22  2.28    0.369   
1990     7.43*  3.17    1.58  1.52    6.90*  1.28    -1.95  1.46     5.10   3.35    4.25* 2.02    0.400   
1994     6.48*  3.02    0.44  1.46    6.27*  1.23    -2.22  1.37     3.46   3.21    3.13  1.90    0.345   
 
 
                                          B. First-Difference Regressions       
Dependent Variable: Change in log(U.S. Employment Share/Swedish Employment Share) 
 
                                     Shortfall      Shortfall 
          Excess          Excess        in             in          W/I SD of       W/I SD of 
        Predicted        Residual    Predicted      Residual       Predicted       Residual       Adjusted         
           Wage S.E.    Wage  S.E.     Wage  S.E.     Wage  S.E.    Wages  S.E.    Wages  S.E.    R-squared 
1960-70  -1.27  1.34    1.43* 0.59     0.89  0.58     0.55  0.62    0.58   1.39    -1.85  0.82    0.145   
1960-85   1.42  4.22    1.64  1.89     5.10* 1.79     0.31  1.94    -6.53  4.39     2.04  2.63    0.329   
1970-85   1.19  3.35    0.36  1.54     3.28* 1.41     0.14  1.56    -5.62  3.48     3.32  2.09    0.280   
1970-90   0.80  2.67    0.26  1.25     2.69* 1.11     0.05  1.24    -3.58  2.78     2.98  1.67    0.265   
1975-85   0.38  2.37    0.82  1.08     2.06* 1.00    -0.18  1.11    -2.16  2.47     2.42  1.49    0.175   
1975-90   0.14  1.76    0.66  0.82     1.59* 0.73    -0.28  0.82    -0.50  1.84     2.19  1.11    0.161   
1980-85   1.16  1.64    0.12  0.75     1.07  0.68     0.04  0.76    -0.67  1.72     2.33* 1.03    0.163   
1980-90   0.97  1.25   -0.05  0.58     0.69  0.51    -0.08  0.57     0.82  1.32     2.07* 0.78    0.155   
985-90   -0.24  0.86   -0.19  0.40    -0.31  0.35    -0.03  0.40     1.20  0.91    -0.31  0.55    0.026   
1985-94  -1.65  1.36   -1.13  0.64    -1.01  0.56    -0.25  0.63    -0.52  1.44    -1.30  0.86    0.121   
1990-94  -1.28  0.95   -0.95* 0.46    -0.67  0.38    -0.20  0.43    -1.91  1.00    -0.93  0.60    0.142   
  
  
      See notes to Table 7. 




Sources: (a) Swedish data on the 90-10 log earnings differential for full-time, full-year workers, 1975-1996, are 
from Statistics Sweden/HINK, as reported in Johansson, Lundborg and Zetterberg (1999). (b) U.S. data on the 
hours-weighted standard deviation of log hourly wages, 1963-1994, were constructed by the authors from the 
Annual Demographic Files of the March Current Population Survey. See the Appendix for additional detail. (c) 
Swedish data on the standard deviation of log hourly wages, 1968-1988, were supplied by Per Anders Edin. The 
data for 1968, 1974 and 1981 are constructed from the Level of Living Survey (LNU), and the data for 1984, 
1986 and 1988 are constructed from the Household Market and Nonmarket Activities Survey (HUS). (d) 
Swedish data on the standard deviation of log hourly wages for private-sector blue-collar workers, 1970-1990, 








Source: Constructed by the authors as described in the text. 
 
 
 Standard Deviation of Log Hourly Wages, Swedish Workers, 1968-1988
St. Dev. of Log Hourly Wages, Private Blue-Collar Swedish Workers, 1970-1990
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